Dwi Soetjipto: Petral's buying price is higher
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Kamis, 1 Januari 1970 07:00 WIB
TEMPO.CO, Jakarta - The results of KordaMentha's forensic investigation on Petral are not that much different from the findings of the Oil and Gas Governance Reform Team. Trading of crude oil and petroleum by Petral, a Pertamina subsidiary, was found to have deviated from regulations, resulting in inefficiencies in the company. Pertamina CEO Dwi Soetjipto admitted the difficulty in reforming Petral since he was appointed to head the state-owned oil and gas company. "There seems to be communication between outsiders and Petral insiders," Dwi told Tempo reporters Arif Zulkifli, Sunudyantoro, Retno Sulistyowati, Ayu Prima Sandi and Singgih Soares at the Pertamina headquarters last week.
What was the result on the Petral audit?
Essentially, the auditor said there was an anomaly inside Petral's acquisition process so that their buying price is higher. Petral deviated because Pertamina management had arranged it in such a way so sales would go in the direction of the national oil company (NOC). So, what happened was limited competition and the prices were high. Apparently, the volume and the price from these companies were pre-determined. Second, secret or classified information on prices being set internally was leaked out. As a result, our requirements for next month was known well beforehand by other people. Third, there were outside parties that influenced the business process of Petral, which became the NOC's indirect partner. If the NOC wanted to trade in oil, it had to be done through Petral. The NOC became nothing more than a front.
What kind of communication is there with the people inside?
There was an email address for communication. It's suspected that this mailing list group was the communication platform between external parties and Petral. But our colleagues at Petral never admitted to this. To the auditors, they claim to have forgotten the password (of the email).
Are those uncooperative employees still at Pertamina?
They were suspended since this report was submitted. We will take further action against them later.
Do the companies cited by the auditors still deal with the Integrated Supply Chain (ICS)?
Among the four companies mentioned, a few of them still won tenders during the first quarter of 2015. But today the tender process has changed and is now more open. The instance they apply, we erase their names and they are just given a code.
In the second quarter, their names no longer appear. We are now suspending them.
Has Pertamina blacklisted them?
That's how it will be. Right now we are waiting for the legal outcome. We emphasize: what happened in the past should not be repeated.
Is it true Riza Chalid placed his own people inside Pertamina and Petral?
Petral was autonomous. Its salary system was not registered in Pertamina's books. I know because when I asked for the list of CEO salaries of subsidiaries, the Petral figures did not appear. There is someone else even stronger in Pertamina who regulated all this, including remunerations inside Petral. I'm still studying it.
What will be Pertamina's next step?
We will, of course, improve the system and the procedures. The bidding process will be improved and oversight must be better. Transparency will be raised. The anomaly happens because of the lack of transparency. The vendor partners must also be evaluated, particularly those listed in the (audit) report. The audit results will also be followed up by the authorities, including the KPK.
Will the insiders be penalized?
If there have been losses, the punishment can come in many forms, from warnings to dismissals. Our supply partners can be blacklisted. If there is a criminal element, then we will take the appropriate action.
But don't inefficiency and high price cause losses to the state?
The report does not mention losses to the state. We realize the price is higher, especially since oil in 2016 will go down even further from MOPS 92. So we will continue to process it. We hope that those implicated will become justice collaborators. (*)