The Risk of Polarization and the Opportunity of Engagement

TEMPO.CO, Jakarta - The current political dynamics of Indonesia’s 2017 democratic elections, although it’s still a significant time away, portrays a trajectory that, just like US elections, it is going to be divisive. One focal phenomenon underlying this trajectory is the anti-Ahok Muslim march on the 4th of November; millions participated in the rally within and outside of the capital, and millions more, through donations and coordinating food banks, supported the event.

What started as an apolitical movement to demand lawful accountability of Ahok’s alleged blasphemous act, now has generated significant political gravity. It has drawn the support of famous politicians, like Fadhli Zon, Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, and even former president himself Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY); many reasoned to have political motives. It has forced Joko Widodo to respond; giving, not just a statement in the rally’s aftermath, but also a show of power as he publicly consolidated his support in military apparatuses and influential Muslim organizations (i.e. NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI). The rally even succeeded in getting the police and judiciary to start the Ahok trials themselves.

There is reason to believe that these actions, the politicization of the rally, the show of force by Jokowi, and the trial itself, wont actually do good to quench the demands of protestors.  Firstly, regardless of the trial and other response, the politicization of the issue in itself is one that will result in the polarization of the views of these protestors. With politicians supporting the rally without calling out that the possible latent discriminatory beliefs that its supporters carries within is wrong, such as support done by SBY and Fadli Zon, supporters believe that they have structural and objective legitimacy to go with their cause and belief; thus the right to go forth and uphold these beliefs.

Secondly, Jokowi’s show of force is one that also has a polarizing risk. The reason being is that protestors would most likely see his acts of national consolidation as an act that calls for the need for them to further consolidate. We need to understand that these protestors, having proof from the massive nation-wide support that they have gathered in earlier rallies, have currently a mob mentality sense of unity. The show of threat, would provide them further reason to group and give them further reason to advocate sympathy in between the group; that they are facing an uphill battle and that they are fighting against all odds. This can actually strengthen their intra-group consolidation and increase inter-group sentiments.

Lastly, even there is reason to believe that the trials themselves are not going to be effective in dispersing the rally’s need to fight against Ahok. Firstly because, in the course of the trial, according to applying laws and as stated by the head of the General Election Commission himself, Ahok is not required to step down. Secondly, because even when courts make decisions, they only provide a yes-or-no verdict. Despite the fact that there will be reasonings to those verdicts, grassroots societies, particularly these protestors, are not involved in the decision and thus can doubt the process or even reject the reasoning altogether; feeling that their concerns are not attended to. This leaves little room to quench their fears and anger on Ahok.

So how should the state respond to these rallies? On a general level, the state needs to engage and have a mediated discussion with the protestors of the rally. There needs to be a genuine effort to listen and attempt to understand where their anger is coming from, because their reasons to protest might not simply be religious or ideological. We need to understand that Ahok’s alleged blasphemous act might simply be a triggering cause, not the root cause of why the majority of these individuals protest. These anger can be built up and intertwined by multiple root causes (i.e. Ahok’s perceived arrogance to the people and Ahok’s relocation policies and its impacts, are a few examples), and only with a mediated discussion can the state actually know what these are and thus how to diffuse them.

Jokowi is already correct in initiating discussions with heads of Muslim organizations such as what he did with Muhammadiyah, NU, MUI. But this is not enough, mainly because these heads of the organizations are not what most of the supporters of the rallies listen to. One need to understand that there are a myriad of school of thoughts and interpretation of Islam within Indonesia and even within these organizations themselves. It is of key importance to talk with the specific leaders that are representative of these protestors.

It is also necessary to point out that discussions should occur not only on a state level, but also on a grassroots level. People against the rallies should not label these protestors as kafir or radicals and assume that they do not have any legitimate cause to protest, because such action would simply push them further away into their own echo-chamber where the thoughts and news that circulate within are thoughts and news that simply further solidify their anger.

Many people have highlighted their anger towards just how divisive these rallies are and how divisive the 2017 general elections can be, and it might be hard for them to take in their anger and listen to what the other side are actually arguing for. But if both sides aren’t willing to listen and mediate themselves between each other, then the only end to these strings of angry rallies are further angry rallies and further angry commentaries; an ultimately polarized and divided election, and society.

ALIF SATRIA, INTERN at CSIS